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THE MOST REVEALING WORD 
IN THE  
UNITED STATES REPORTS 
Richard Primus† 
T’S AT 567 U.S. 648, ABOUT A QUARTER of the way down the page. 
But let’s lay some foundation first. 
The most prominent issue in NFIB v. Sebelius1 was whether Con-
gress’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause stops at a point 
marked by a distinction between “activity” and “inactivity.” According to 
the law’s challengers, prior decisions about the scope of the commerce 
power already reflected the importance of the distinction between action 
and inaction. In all of the previous cases in which exercises of the commerce 
power had been sustained, the challengers argued, that power had been used 
to regulate activity. Never had Congress tried to regulate mere inactivity. 
In NFIB, four Justices rejected that contention, writing that such a distinction 
was previously unknown. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg described the idea of 
an activity/inactivity distinction as a limit on the commerce power as “a 
newly minted constitutional doctrine”2 conveniently engineered to declare 
the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate unconstitutional.  
                                                                                                                         
† Richard Primus is the Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor at The University of Michigan 
Law School. Copyright 2019 Richard Primus. 
1 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
2 NFIB at 605 (Opinion of Ginsburg, J.). 
I 
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But five Justices – Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito – agreed with the challengers that commerce doctrine 
regarded the distinction between activity and inactivity as significant. Unlike 
the other four Justices, the Chief Justice did not think it followed that the 
ACA was unconstitutional, because, unlike the other four Justices, the Chief 
Justice concluded that Congress’s taxing power was sufficient authority for 
enacting the ACA. But on the Commerce Clause question, these five were 
in agreement: activity is one thing, and inactivity another. In his opinion 
announcing the judgment of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts duly adduced 
language from prior decisions to show that the Court had routinely spoken 
of “activity” when sustaining exercises of the commerce power. The Chief 
Justice wrote as follows: 
As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce 
power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uni-
formly describe the power as reaching “activity.” It is nearly impos-
sible to avoid the word when quoting them. See, e.g. [United States 
v. Lopez] (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained”); 
[United States v. Perez] (“Where the class of activities is regulated and 
that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no 
power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class”); [Wickard 
v. Filburn] (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may 
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (“Although 
activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, 
if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect 
that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot 
be denied the power to exercise that control”) . . . .3 
The argument on offer is clear enough. By quoting the language of prior 
cases, Chief Justice Roberts could rebut Justice Ginsburg’s charge that the 
activity/inactivity distinction was “invented out of whole cloth[.]”4 On the 
                                                                                                                         
3 NFIB at 551 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphases altered). 
4 NFIB at 658 (Opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.) (describing Justice 
Ginsburg’s characterization). 
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contrary, the prior cases’ use of the language of “activity” showed that the 
distinction between activity and inactivity was a longstanding feature of 
constitutional doctrine.  
Pointing to prior decisions that make use of a given distinction is an ex-
cellent way to show that the distinction is not novel. But to read the Su-
preme Court’s pre-NFIB cases as giving force to (or even noticing) a dis-
tinction between the regulation of activity and the regulation of inactivity, 
one must think that the words “activity” and “activities” in the quoted cases 
were meant to be used in a limiting sense. One must think, that is, that 
when the Lopez Court wrote “Where economic activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce,” it had in mind that the word “activity” narrowed 
the domain of the sentence by excluding anything properly described as 
“inactivity.” Similarly, one must think that when the Wickard Court wrote 
“even if appellee’s activity be local,” it meant to say that its analysis applied 
only because Farmer Filburn was doing something “active,” and that the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act could not have been validly written to reach 
Filburn had he been “inactive” instead. 
I doubt that the language of “activity” in those cases was meant to carry 
those meanings. It seems to me more likely that that language in the quoted 
sentences was used in a less precise way: not to name a category of “activity” 
distinct from “inactivity” but as a general synonym for “stuff being regulated.” 
I think, in other words, that when the Perez Court wrote “Where the class 
of activities is regulated,” it meant the same thing that would be meant by 
“Where the subject matter at issue is regulated”; and when the Wickard 
Court wrote “even if appellee’s activity be local,” it meant the same thing 
that would be meant by “even if the subject matter in this case were local.”  
To support this view, I offer, as Exhibit A, the most revealing word in 
the United States Reports. That word, unsurprisingly at this point in the 
analysis, is “activity.” In particular, it is that word as it appears at the end 
of a paragraph near the very beginning of NFIB’s joint dissent. 
In their joint opinion, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito 
adopted the view that the individual mandate of the ACA was beyond the 
commerce power because that power authorizes Congress only to regulate 
activity as opposed to inactivity. In a short introduction to their opinion, 
they identified the stakes of the question. It is a fundamental principle, they 
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insisted, that the Commerce Clause cannot reach “all private conduct.”5 
They continued as follows: 
That clear principle carries the day here. The striking case of Wickard 
v. Filburn, which held that the economic activity of growing wheat, 
even for one’s own consumption, affected commerce sufficiently 
that it could be regulated, always has been regarded as the ne plus 
ultra of expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence. To go beyond 
that, and to say the failure to grow wheat (which is not an economic 
activity, or any activity at all) nonetheless affects commerce and 
therefore can be federally regulated, is to make mere breathing in 
and out the basis for federal prescription and to extend federal 
power to virtually all human activity.6 
Again, the argument is clear. If the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress 
to regulate inactivity as well as activity, then the federal government can 
regulate everything. And that cannot be right.7 
But read the paragraph carefully. When you get to the last three 
words, slow down, and ask yourself what the word “activity” means in the 
phrase “all human activity” here. It cannot possibly mean something dis-
tinct from “inactivity.” It can only mean something like “all of human ex-
istence, including not just activity but also inactivity.” The point of the 
sentence, after all, is that the individual mandate extended congressional 
regulation beyond “activity” (in the limiting sense) and into the domain of 
                                                                                                                         
5 NFIB at 647 (Opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.). 
6 NFIB at 647-48 (Opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.). 
7 Presumably, the Joint Dissenters did not mean to suggest that congressional power to 
regulate inactivity would mean congressional power to pass any law whatsoever, because 
the Constitution contains many affirmative prohibitions on what Congress can do. Even if 
Congress possessed general legislative jurisdiction, it could not pass a law establishing a 
religion or enacting a bill of attainder. What the joint dissenters should actually be under-
stood to be arguing, therefore, is that congressional power to regulate inactivity would 
mean congressional power to regulate anything except as prohibited by affirmative constitu-
tional prohibitions. And it cannot be the case that Congress is limited only by affirmative 
prohibitions, in their view, because it is a fundamental principle that Congress is limited by 
the enumeration of its powers, even without respect to affirmative prohibitions. I think 
that the proposition that Congress must be limited by its enumerated powers is wrong. 
See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014). But for present 
purposes, what is important is understanding what the joint dissenters were saying, not 
whether that statement was the best view of the relevant constitutional law. 
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something that was not activity. So “activity” here cannot mean the limiting 
thing that the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters claim it meant in prior 
cases. It has to name something that does not distinguish between activity 
and inactivity. 
Four Justices of the Supreme Court signed the joint dissent. Those four 
Justices employed sixteen law clerks. Apparently not one of those twenty 
talented lawyers read this paragraph and said “Actually, wait – the word 
‘activity’ is used here in too broad a sense.” Instead, every one of them 
seems to have regarded this use of the word “activity” – which encom-
passes “inactivity” – as normal and appropriate. 
The joint dissent in NFIB was not some little-noticed document to 
which its signatories gave scant attention. The case was an era-defining 
blockbuster, and everybody knew it. Whether commerce doctrine affords 
significance to a distinction between activity and inactivity lay at the center 
of the case. If ever there were a case in which Justices and law clerks 
should have been finely attuned to that distinction, it was NFIB. No opinion 
ever written has been more insistent than NFIB’s joint dissent about the 
importance of that distinction. Yet even that opinion, in the paragraph 
introducing the “clear principle” on which it insists, uses the word “activity” 
in a way that fails to respect the distinction. It is the most revealing word 
in the United States Reports.8 
What it reveals should be obvious. If even the NFIB joint dissent used 
“activity” to name something that does not distinguish between “activity” 
and “inactivity,” there is little reason to think that Justices in earlier cases 
where the activity/inactivity question was not relevant or discussed were 
using the word in a more precise and limiting way. It makes much more 
sense to think that they used it in the more general, nonlimiting way that 
even the NFIB joint dissenters sometimes deployed. If so, the various uses 
of the word “activity” in prior decisions do not suggest that prior commerce 
doctrine contemplated a difference between the regulation of activity and 
the regulation of inactivity. The attempt to present those prior uses of lan-
                                                                                                                         
8 Truth to tell, I am not invested in its being the most revealing word in all of the United 
States Reports. If someone has a candidate for a word that is yet more revealing, I see no 
need to enter pitched battle on the question of who is entitled to claim the superlative. 
The important point, which I hope is sufficiently established, is just that this one is pretty 
revealing. 
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guage as proof of the significance of that distinction thus stands revealed as 
a distorting piece of revisionism.  
It does not follow that Chief Justice Roberts and the joint dissenters 
were wrong to think that the commerce power stops at the activity/ 
inactivity line. The refinement and modification of doctrine is a normal 
aspect of decisionmaking in a common-law system, so the fact that a doctri-
nal distinction was unknown before a certain date does not suffice to prove 
that that distinction could not be validly introduced thereafter. In my view, 
the most important reason why the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters 
were wrong on the commerce question in NFIB, as I believe they were, is 
not that the activity/inactivity distinction was novel but that it makes little 
sense as a tool for the rational shaping of the commerce power.9 But a great 
deal of ink has been spilled on that question, and I do not propose to treat 
it comprehensively here. The present subject is specifically the pedigree of 
the action/inaction distinction, not its ultimate merits. That said, though 
the pedigree issue does not exhaust the ultimate question, it is an important 
piece of the picture – important enough that the ACA’s defenders thought 
it worthwhile to press the claim that the distinction was newly minted and 
that the distinction’s promoters thought it worthwhile to insist that it had 
long been visible in the Court’s prior cases. 
The willingness of five Justices to adopt the action/inaction distinction 
in NFIB was not solely a function of their reading of caselaw, nor of their 
reading of caselaw combined with their readings of constitutional text. It 
was also partly a matter of the context in which the issue was presented. 
Some and perhaps all of those Justices had a background sense that preexist-
ing doctrine construed the commerce power too broadly, such that oppor-
tunities to pare it back would be welcome. It also seems safe to assume that 
some and likely all of those Justices regarded the Affordable Care Act as a 
                                                                                                                         
9 Limiting that power on the basis of an action/inaction distinction has no tendency to 
facilitate anything valuable about federalism, nor about any other aspect of the constitu-
tional system, because it does not map anything about how the system should allocate 
decisionmaking among its various decisionmaking institutions. Some readers may be 
tempted by the thought that this limit does promote something valuable because any ob-
stacle to federal lawmaking is valuable. I do not share that view. But if that view were 
correct, it would still not be clear why an action/inaction distinction would be superior 
to any other limitation that might be arbitrarily imposed. 
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Seriously Bad Thing, whether for reasons of federalism10 or otherwise11 
and probably both. But those background factors, important as they were, 
would probably not have sufficed to prompt five Justices to say that an act 
of Congress was beyond the commerce power unless they could articulate 
that conclusion by reference to some rule. And not just any rule would do. 
It would need to be a rule that seemed like the sort of thing that makes a 
difference in legal analysis. One can distinguish laws signed by Presidents 
in the morning from laws signed in the afternoon, but it is hard to imagine 
that anything of legal significance could turn on the distinction. So no matter 
how negatively a judge felt toward a particular federal statute, it would be 
hard to get that judge to say that the statute exceeded Congress’s commerce 
power because the bill was signed into law at 10:15 a.m.  
The distinction between activity and inactivity is part of the lawyer’s 
standard set of moves. It isn’t always the right distinction to draw, but every 
judge recognizes it as the kind of thing that might matter. So when that 
distinction was offered to five Justices who were keen to articulate limits 
on Congress and would not have been sorry to see the ACA disappear, the 
conditions were favorable for getting those Justices to construe prior 
caselaw as favorable to their applying an action/inaction limit in the case 
                                                                                                                         
10 The ACA was the most ambitious federal regulatory scheme in more than a generation, 
so it could easily trigger concerns about federal overreach. This is so even if the relevant 
intuition about federalism was not articulable in terms of doctrinal categories. It could 
also be rooted in a more inchoate sense of what should be done nationally and what locally.  
11 Different kinds of factors are in play here. Within the register of small-c constitutionalism – 
fundamental questions about structure and ethos, whether or not attached to specific parts 
of the written Constitution – the ACA may have unsettled a general expectation that in 
the American system, one makes one’s living in the capitalist market, subject to a set of 
exemptions for people unable to do so like the elderly and the disabled. Less exaltedly, 
one should not dismiss the fact that the ACA provoked strong opposition for non-
constitutional reasons sounding in policy and partisanship and that all five Justices who 
accepted the action/inaction distinction were appointed by presidents from a political 
party that maintained unanimous opposition to the ACA in both Houses of Congress. 
Non-constitutional factors shouldn’t shape judicial attitudes on constitutional questions, 
but sometimes they do. This is not to say that the Justices deliberately acted on the basis 
of policy or partisan preferences; it is merely to note that decisionmakers (of all political 
orientations) often engage in motivated reasoning, such that they are more willing to 
accept arguments whose conclusions strike them as congenial than arguments running in 
other directions. 
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before them. And so they did. But in that endeavor, they needed to impute 
to their predecessors a specialized use of language – specialized enough 
that they themselves could not maintain it, even when they should most 
have done so. Using the phrase “all human activity” in their moment of 
peroration was a tell-tale blunder: Even if the joint dissenters believed in 
perfectly good faith that their argument was correct, the marker they left 
behind tells a different story. 
 
 
 
